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ABSTRACT
Camouflaging data by generating fake information is a well-
known obfuscation technique for protecting data privacy.
The effectiveness of this technique in protecting users’ pri-
vacy highly depends on the resemblance of fake information
to reality, such that an adversary cannot easily filter such
fake information out. In this paper, we focus on a very
sensitive and increasingly exposed type of data: location
data. There are two main scenarios in which fake traces are
of extreme value to preserve location privacy: publishing
datasets of location trajectories, and using location-based
services. Despite advances in protecting (location) data pri-
vacy, there is no quantitative method to evaluate how realis-
tic a synthetic trace is, and how much utility and privacy it
provides in each scenario. Also, the lack of a methodology
to generate privacy-preserving fake traces is evident. In this
paper, we fill this gap and propose the first statistical metric
and model to generate fake location traces such that both
the utility of data and the privacy of users are preserved.
We build upon the fact that, although geographically they
visit distinct locations, people have strongly semantically
similar mobility patterns, for example, their transition pat-
tern across activities (e.g., working, driving, staying at home)
is similar. We define a statistical metric and propose an al-
gorithm that automatically discovers the hidden semantic
similarities between locations from a bag of real location
traces as seeds, without requiring any initial semantic an-
notations. We guarantee that fake traces are geographically
dissimilar to their seeds, so they do not leak sensitive loca-
tion information. We also protect contributors to seed traces
against membership attacks. Interleaving fake traces with
mobile users’ traces is a prominent location privacy defense
mechanism. We quantitatively show the effectiveness of our
methodology in protecting against localization inference at-
tacks while preserving utility of sharing/publishing traces.
1. INTRODUCTION
Fake (dummy) information can protect privacy and se-
curity in many different systems such as web search [11],
anonymous communications [3, 8], authentication systems
[12], and statistical analysis [17, 23]. In all these scenar-
ios, the main challenge and the open problem is to generate
context-dependent fake information that resembles genuine
user-produced data and also provides an acceptable level of
utility while enhancing privacy of users.
In this paper, we propose a systematic approach for pre-
serving privacy of location data using fake traces. We focus
on two practical scenarios: sharing location with location-
based services, and publishing location datasets e.g., for re-
search. In location-based systems, users hide their true loca-
tion among fake location traces while connecting to a server
to obtain contextual information about their whereabouts.
This protects them against the location inference attacks.
The benefit of the fake injection approach with respect to
other obfuscation techniques, such as location perturbation
[1, 10, 28], is that it does not reduce the users’ experienced
service quality. Users only incur the overhead of filtering out
the received information about fake locations. In publish-
ing privacy-preserving location datasets, the purpose is to
preserve the general statistics about human mobility. There
is a utility loss associated with fake traces as they might
not fully preserve all the characteristics of real traces. The
challenge is to generate synthetic traces that semantically
resemble the real traces yet do not leak information about
the exact geographic locations visited by any particular in-
dividual. This gives rise to a tradeoff between utility and
privacy that is inherent to privacy-preserving systems.
There has been some preliminary work on using fake lo-
cation queries to protect users’ location privacy [6, 13, 15,
26, 32]. However, they are based on very simple heuristics
such as i.i.d. location sampling, sampling locations from a
random walk on a grid with uniform probability, and us-
ing road trip algorithms to generate driving traces between
two random locations. In this paper, we quantitatively show
that these methods fail to protect location privacy against
inference attacks. Besides, what these methods are missing
are (i) a metric that captures how realistic a synthetic loca-
tion trace is with respect to human mobility, so it cannot be
easily detected by attacker, (ii) a generative model that pro-
duces samples of synthetic yet realistic traces according to
such a metric, while preserving utility and ensuring that the
synthetic traces do not themselves leak information about
any individual. In this paper, we present the first formal
methodology to solve these problems and to generate fake
yet semantically real location traces for protecting location
privacy. We also enforce, and quantitatively measure, pri-
vacy against location privacy attacks.
Our scheme is based on the fact that mobility patterns of
different individuals share some semantic features, regard-
less of which geographic locations they visit. These common
features of human mobility stem from their similar lifestyles.
The mobility patterns share a similar structure that reflects
the general behavior of a population (even at a high level
[29]). We model the mobility of each individual in two di-
mensions: geographic and semantic. The geographic features
are mostly specific to each individual (hence are sensitive),
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whereas the semantic features are mostly generic and repre-
sentative of human mobility behavior (hence are useful). We
extract the common semantic features of mobility patterns
and use them to generate realistic synthetic traces, without
leaking the geographic features of any individual’s locations.
Consequently, we define two metrics to quantify the sim-
ilarity between human mobility models: The geographic
similarity metric between two individuals captures how cor-
rectly we can predict locations of one knowing the mobility
model of the other one. This metric helps us to capture the
spatiotemporal information leakage of a fake trace about a
real trace. The semantic similarity metric reflects how well
two traces match in terms of their semantic features. We
assume that we have a dataset of real traces. We develop
an algorithm that automatically learns the semantic corre-
lation between locations and transitions between locations.1
To generate semantically realistic fake traces, we transform
a (real) seed trace into the semantic domain and probabilis-
tically sample (fake) location traces that are consistent with
it. Thus, a generated sample resembles a typical sequence of
locations that could have been visited by some real individ-
ual. We then design a rejection sampling assertion to ensure
that a fake trace does not leak information about the loca-
tions in its seed trace, i.e., we reject those who do not meet
the privacy requirements. Thereby, we protect privacy of
seed traces against the following threats: Inference attacks
(to learn which locations the seed contributors have visited),
and membership inclusion attack (to learn if a particular in-
dividual with certain semantic habits has been in the seed
dataset). If a fake trace’s geographic similarity or its inter-
section with its real seed trace exceeds a given threshold, we
reject it and sample a new trace. We also ensure that the
semantic similarity between fake and seed traces cannot be
used against anonymity of seed traces. To this end, we re-
ject the fake trace if there is no k− 1 alternative real traces
that could have been the seed for generating the fake (i.e.,
the differential semantic similarity with the fake trace is be-
low a threshold). This additionally guarantees a plausible
deniability for each seed trace. The resulting pool of fake
traces can later be drawn upon for use by e.g., users’ smart-
phones. The fake traces generated from the seed database
can be used to protect location privacy of any user (not the
contributed of the seed database). The privacy tests guar-
antee that we preserve privacy of seed traces. Additionally,
we show that the generated fakes can significantly protect
privacy of LBS users against inference attacks.
Our Contributions: In summary, the novelty of this work
is twofold. (1) We introduce the notion of semantic similar-
ity for mobility patterns, we propose both a metric for it, and
an algorithm to quantify the semantic similarity between lo-
cation traces. We also automatically learn the semantic re-
lation between locations. (2) We propose a generative model
for fake location traces that are semantically similar to real
traces. We also guarantee plausible deniability to individu-
als whose real traces are used as seed in our algorithm. Our
software tool, given a set of real location traces, generates
fake traces based on our theoretical framework. We run our
algorithms on a real-world dataset collected by Nokia [14].
We show the effectiveness of our fake traces in protecting pri-
1Note that we do not annotate the locations (as home, work,
...), nor we use any annotation as an input to compute the
similarity between locations. We only rely on location traces
as input.
A trace is a sequence of 
locations visited over time
Real Location Traces
Seeds
Mobility Models per 
Location Trace
Aggregate Mobility 
Model
Location Semantic 
Graph
Location Semantic 
Classes
     We cluster the graph, 
so similar locations form 
semantic classes, each 
shown with a color  
   From the similarity 
between mobility traces, we 
infer the semantic similarity 
between locations, and build 
a graph to represent it
We compute mobility model 
for each trace and also their 
aggregate mobility (as e.g., 
the probabilistic model for 
average mobility)
We transform the seed 
trace into the semantic 
domain by replacing each 
location with all equivalent 
locations in its cluster
Semantic Seed
Fake Trace
     We generate a fake trace that 
can be mapped back to the same 
semantic seed and follows the 
aggregate mobility model
Privacy Rejection Test
We reject the fake traces that do 
not satisfy privacy requirements, 
e.g., their geographic similarity with 
the seed exceeds a threshold
1 2 3
4
5
6
7
Fake Location Traces
Figure 1: Sketch of the proposed scheme.
vacy of users in two main scenarios: location-based services
and published location datasets, while preserving utility.
2. OUR SCHEME
In this section, we present a sketch of, and describe the
main intuition behind, our scheme for generating fake traces.
We assume that time and space are discrete, so a location
trace is represented as a sequence of visited locations over
time. In our scheme, we generate a fake trace through a
multiple step process. Figure 1 illustrates the details.
2.1 Computing the Semantic Similarity
The first step is to compute the semantic similarity be-
tween the set of locations in an area. We learn these sim-
ilarity values automatically from a dataset of real location
traces. For each trace (i.e., the sequence of locations vis-
ited by a single individual) in the dataset, we first com-
pute a probabilistic mobility model that represents the vis-
iting probability to each location and transition probability
among the locations (see Section 3.1). The mobility model
encompasses the spatiotemporal behavior of each individ-
ual with respect to different locations. Time, duration, and
probability (frequency) of visiting a location, as well as the
probable comings from and goings to locations are all com-
putable from the mobility model. So, it implicitly reflects
the types of activities that an individual might carry out in
each location (and over a sequence of locations).
We analyze and discover the semantic relation between
different locations in a consistent manner by considering all
locations together. To this end, we propose a semantic simi-
larity metric (see Section 3.4). Intuitively, we assign a higher
similarity value to the pair of locations at which different in-
dividuals have similar spatiotemporal activities. Thus, our
metric tries to find the optimal way to map the visited lo-
cations in a pair of traces such that the mapping maximizes
the statistical similarity between their mobility models. The
semantic similarity metric is therefore the statistical similar-
ity between mobility models under the optimal mapping be-
tween locations. This means that if we were to translate the
locations of this pair according to the discovered best map-
ping, they would follow the same mobility model when their
semantic similarity is high. For example, consider Alice and
Bob spending all day at their respective work locations wA
and wB , and all night at their respective home locations hA
and hB . Obviously, their mobility models are semantically
very similar, although it might be the case that hA 6= hB
and wA 6= wB . In this example, the best semantic mapping
between locations will be wA ↔ wB and hA ↔ hB .
For each pair of mobility models for traces in our dataset,
we compute their semantic similarity as well as the best se-
mantic mapping between their locations. We then aggregate
all the location matchings across all trace pairs, with weights
based on the semantic similarity between mobility models,
and construct a location semantic graph, where the nodes are
locations and the weight of the edges is the average semantic
similarity between the locations over the dataset.
2.2 Forming Location Semantic Classes
The location semantic graph enables us to find what lo-
cations have similar meanings for different people, so they
have similar activities in those places. The locations that
have higher semantic similarity can be grouped together to
represent one location semantic class. To this end, we run a
clustering algorithm on the location semantic graph to par-
tition locations into distinct classes. Locations that fall into
the same class are visited in the same way by different peo-
ple regardless of their geographic positions.2 Thus, we can
consider them as being semantically equivalent. So, using
the notations of our previous example, wA and wB should
belong to the same cluster that can represent “workplace”
locations, and hA and hB should be grouped into another
cluster representing residential or “home” locations.
2.3 Generating a Fake Trace
We use the location semantic classes as the basis to gen-
erate fake traces. In addition to being semantically realistic,
the fake traces must be geographically consistent with the
general mobility of individuals in the considered area. For
example, the speed of moving in some locations differs de-
pending on the time, or the probabilities of taking different
paths is different. To capture these patterns, we compute an
aggregate mobility model from the traces in our dataset. We
can, for example, compute this by averaging the mobility
models that we constructed on the traces.
The goal is to generate fake traces that are semantically
similar to real traces. In order to construct a fake trace, our
algorithm starts with a seed trace and converts it to a prob-
abilistically generated semantically similar synthetic trace
which is consistent with the aggregate mobility model. We
pick the seed trace at random from the trace dataset. The
seed trace, similar to other location traces in the database,
is composed of a sequence of geographic locations. In our
algorithm, we first transform the geographic seed trace into
the semantic domain, then we use the transformed seman-
tic trace to sample from the state space of all geographic
traces that could have been transformed to the same se-
mantic trace. The transformation and sampling procedures,
which are at the heart of this step, are done as follows.
For the seed trace transformation, we replace the geo-
graphic locations in the seed with the locations that are
in the same semantic class. This seed semantic trace is a
sequence of location sets. For the fake trace sampling, we
address the following problem. We want to construct a trace
2
Their visit probability, time of visit, and the probabilities of transi-
tion from/to them to/from other locations of the same type is similar.
R Set of locations
R Number of locations
r A location
r Random variable associated with a location
T Number of time periods
τ A time period
p(u) Transition probability matrix of user u
pi(u) Visiting probability vector of user u
〈p(u), pi(u)〉 Mobility profile of user u
pxy(u) Probability of x given y according to u’s mobility model
d(·) A distance function (between locations)
Md(p, q) Mallows distance between probability distributions
p and q based on a distance function d(·)
σ A permutation function
simG(u, v) Geographic similarity between mobility of u and v
simS(u, v) Semantic similarity between mobility of u and v
σvu Optimal semantic mapping between locations of u and v
S Set of real traces used as seeds to generate fake traces
〈p¯, p¯i〉 Aggregate mobility model
C A partition on R, representing location semantic classes.
Ci is the set of locations in class (partition) i
F A set of fake locations generated from S
Table 1: Table of notations
that follows the aggregate mobility model under the con-
straint that its locations over time are subset of locations of
the seed semantic trace. Hence, both the fake trace and the
seed trace can be transformed to the same semantic trace.
We add some randomness to the locations in the semantic
trace to allow higher number of possible fake traces. Many
algorithms can be used to sample the fake trace that satis-
fies our constraints. We make use of dynamic programming
algorithms that construct the traces efficiently (Section 4).
We can repeatedly generate fake traces from each seed
trace in the dataset, each of which having a probability ac-
cording to the aggregate mobility model. After generating
each fake trace, however, we need to make sure that it is not
geographically similar to the seed trace. This is because we
do not want to leak information about the real seed trace.
To this end, we add a test to compute the geographic simi-
larity (see Section 3.3) between the seed trace and the fake
trace to reject the sample traces that are more similar than a
threshold to the seed trace. Thus, we make sure that the se-
mantically similar synthetic traces are indeed geographically
dissimilar to the traces in our dataset, hence not leaking in-
formation about visited locations in the real traces.
3. MOBILITY SIMILARITY METRICS
In this section, we present a probabilistic model for mobil-
ity, and propose two metrics to analyze the geographic and
semantic similarity between two mobility models. Table 1
presents the list of notations that we use in this paper.
3.1 Mobility Model
We model the user mobility as a time-dependent first-
order Markov chain on the set of regions (locations). As
users have different behavior and mobility patterns during
different periods of time, we assume that time is partitioned
into time periods, e.g., morning - afternoon - evening - night.
So, the mobility profile 〈p(u), pi(u)〉 of a given user u is a
transition probability matrix of the Markov chain associated
with the user’s mobility (from a region to another), and
the user’s visiting probability distribution over the regions,
respectively. Note that these probabilities are dependent on
each other, and together they constitute the joint probability
of two regions that are subsequently visited by the user. The
entry pr
′
r,τ,τ ′(u) of p(u) is the probability that user u will
move to region r′ in the next time instant (which will be in
time period τ ′), given that she is now (in time period τ) in
region r. The entry pirτ (u) is the probability that user u is
in region r in time period τ . Let the random variable Atu
represent the actual location of user u at time t, and τ t be
the time period associated with Atu. So, the mobility profile
of a given user u consists of the following probabilities:
pr
′
r,τ,τ ′(u) = Pr{At+1u = r′ |Atu = r; τ t+1 = τ ′, τ t = τ},
pirτ (u) = Pr{Atu = r; τ t = τ} (1)
This Markovian model can predict the location of an in-
dividual to a great extent, as it takes both location and
time aspect into account. It can become even more precise,
by increasing its order, or by enriching its state. We can,
for example, include multiple granularities of locations, and
model the mobility of a user on the set of e.g., pair of (loca-
tion, neighborhood) in addition to the time dimension. Our
framework can incorporate all these new dimensions similar
to the way we model the time periods. To learn the probabil-
ities of the mobility profile (1), from location traces, we can
use maximum likelihood estimation (if the traces are com-
plete) or make use of algorithms such as Gibbs sampling (if
the traces have missing locations or are noisy) [27].
3.2 Mobility Similarity Metrics
We propose two metrics to compare the mobility of two
users and compute their similarities: geographic and seman-
tic similarity. In this subsection, we describe the intuition
behind these metrics, and in the following subsections, we
formally define and provide the algorithms to compute them.
The geographic similarity metric captures the correlation
between location traces that are generated by two mobility
profiles. It reflects if two users visit similar locations over
time with similar probabilities and if they move between
those locations also with similar probabilities. Using this
metric, for example, two individuals who live in the same
region A and their workplace is in the same region B poten-
tially have very similar mobilities, as they spend their work
hours in B and most of their free time in A.
There are very few people whose mobility patterns have
a high geographic similarity with each other. However, if
we ignore the exact locations that are visited by different
people, we observe that they share similar patterns for visit-
ing locations with similar semantics (locations therein they
have similar activities). For example, most people visit and
stay at a single location from each evening until its subse-
quent morning. These locations differ from one individual
to another, but have the same semantic for them: home.
One can imagine the semantic dimension of locations as a
coloring on the locations in a map. Instead of computing the
correlation between location traces at the geographic level,
we can also compute such correlation at the semantic level
(by reducing the set of locations to the set of colors and
computing the similarity of color traces). This is the intu-
ition behind our semantic similarity metric. In this case,
if the pair of locations that two individuals visit over time
have the same semantic, their mobility models are also se-
mantically similar (even if they are in two different cities,
i.e., have no geographic similarity). Hence, in this example,
if we transform trace A by replacing its locations with their
corresponding semantically similar locations in trace B, the
transformed trace becomes geographically similar to B. So,
two traces are semantically similar if their locations can be
mapped to each other that accordingly one trace can be
transformed to a geographically similar trace to the other.
3.3 Geographic Similarity Metric
We define this similarity metric based on the Earth Mover’s
Distance (EMD) for probability distributions. The EMD is
widely used in a range of applications including image pro-
cessing [24, 25]. The EMD can be understood by thinking
of the two distributions as piles of dirt. In this interpre-
tation, the EMD represents the minimum amount of work
needed to turn one pile of dirt (i.e., one distribution) into
the other; the cost of moving dirt being proportional to both
the amount of dirt and the distance to the destination. The
special case of EMD for probability distributions has been
shown to be equivalent to the Mallows distance [16].
Let X and Y be discrete random variables with probabil-
ity distributions p and q, such that Pr{X = xi} = pi and
Pr{Y = yi} = qi, respectively, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. We also
have
∑
i pi = 1 and
∑
i qi = 1.
Definition 1. (From [16]) Let d(·) be an arbitrary distance
function between X and Y. The Mallows distance Md(p, q)
is defined as the minimum expected distance between X and
Y with respect to d(·) and to any joint distribution function
f for (X,Y) such that p and q are the marginal distributions
of X and Y, respectively.
Md(p, q) :=min
f
{Ef{d(X,Y)} : (X,Y)∼f,X∼p,Y∼q} , (2)
where the expectation, minimized under f , is
Ef{d(X,Y )} =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
fij d(xi, yj). (3)
In addition to the constraints
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 fij = 1 and
fij ≥ 0, for all i, j, the joint probability distribution function
f must also satisfy
∑n
i=1 fij = qj and
∑n
j=1 fij = pi.
Note that, for given p and q, the minimum f is easily
computed by expressing the optimization problem as a linear
program.
Using the previous definition, we define the geographic
similarity metric based on the Mallows distance.
Definition 2. Let d(·) be an arbitrary distance function.
The dissimilarity between two mobility profiles 〈p(u), pi(u)〉
and 〈p(v), pi(v)〉 (belonging to individuals u and v), is de-
fined as the expected Mallows distance of the next random
locations r′ and r′′ according to the mobility profiles of u
and v, respectively. More formally, it is
E(u){Md(pr
′
r,τ,τ ′(u), p
r′′
r,τ,τ ′(v))}, (4)
where pr
′
r,τ,τ ′(u) and p
r′′
r,τ,τ ′(v) denote the conditional prob-
ability distributions of the next location, given the current
location and the current and next time periods. The Mal-
lows function is computed over random variables r′ and r′′,
and the expectation is computed over random variable r and
time periods τ and τ ′.
We define the geographic similarity between mobility pat-
terns of u and v as
simG(u, v) := 1− E{Md(pr
′
r,τ,τ ′(u), p
r′′
r,τ,τ ′(v))}. (5)
We compute the geographic dissimilarity using the law of
total expectation. This also clarifies its meaning by showing
more directly the role of the random variables.
E{Md(pr
′
r,τ,τ ′(u), p
r′′
r,τ,τ ′(v))}
=
∑
r,τ,τ ′
Md(p
r′
r,τ,τ ′(u), p
r′′
r,τ,τ ′(v)) · pr,τ,τ
′
(u). (6)
This is simply the average, for each time and location, of
the EMD between the distributions of the next location of u
and v. So, for each current location (and time), we use the
EMD to compute the dissimilarity between the distributions
representing the next locations of users u and v, respectively.
The current location is taken according to user u’s mobility
profile, making this definition asymmetric.
For a particular distance function d(·), the Mallows dis-
tance definition can be expanded and previous expressions
can be further simplified. This is the case for d(i, j) := 1i6=j ,
for which Md(p, q), for arbitrary probability distributions p
and q, has closed form 1−∑i min {pi, qj}.
Using the dissimilarity metric, we can compute the geo-
graphic similarity between the mobility profiles 〈p(u), pi(u)〉
and 〈p(v), pi(v)〉, for any distance function (e.g., hamming
distance, Euclidean distance). For example, considering ham-
ming distance d(r, r′) = 1r 6=r′ , the geographic similarity is:
1−
∑
r,τ,τ ′
(
1−
∑
r′
min{pr′r,τ,τ ′(u), pr
′
r,τ,τ ′(v)}
)
· pr,τ,τ ′(u)
=
∑
r,r′,τ,τ ′
pτ
′
r,τ (u)pi
r,τ (u) min{pr′r,τ,τ ′(u), pr
′
r,τ,τ ′(v)}. (7)
We emphasize that this definition leads to an asymmetri-
cal similarity measure, i.e. the similarity of u to v need not
be the same as the similarity of v to u. In principle, this met-
ric can also be computed using measures other than EMD.
For example, one can use Kullback-Leibler divergence mea-
sure [7] to compute the difference between two probability
distributions, ignoring the distance between the locations.
We emphasize that we use EMD, in our geographic similar-
ity metric, as we also want to include the distance function
d(·) between locations while computing the difference be-
tween two distributions (i.e., mobility models).
Consider now the computation of the geographic similar-
ity. For the case, d(r, r′) = 1r 6=r′ , the computation accord-
ing to closed-form of (7) takes O(T 2 ·R2) operations, where
T is the number of time periods and R is the number of
locations (regions). For arbitrary d(·) with no closed-form
expressions, the geographic similarity is obtained through
T 2 · R EMD computations. Each of these EMD compu-
tations involves minimizing the Mallows distance, that is
equivalent to solving the linear program given by (2).
3.4 Semantic Similarity Metric
The semantic similarity metric builds upon the basic as-
sumption that for two individuals u and v there exists an
(unknown) semantics mapping σ of locations R onto itself
(i.e. a permutation) such that R, for u and σ−1(R), for v
semantically match. It is important to note that assuming
such a mapping does not commit us to trying to learn it
based on modeling location semantics directly. Instead, we
define the (hidden) semantic similarity between u and v as
the maximum geographic similarity taken over all possible
mappings σ. We define semantic similarity metric as follows.
Definition 3. Let σ be the mapping of locations of u to
locations of v. Let r, r′, and r′′ be random variables for
locations, and τ and τ ′ be two time periods. We define the
semantic dissimilarity between u and v for moving in the
sequence of time periods {τ, τ ′} as
Dvu({τ, τ ′}) := min
σ
E
[
Md(p
r′
r,τ,τ ′(u), p
σ(r′′)
σ(r),τ,τ ′(v))
]
, (8)
where the Mallows distance Md(·) is computed over the ran-
dom variable r′ and the expectation is computed over the
random variable r given time periods τ and τ ′.
Now, we define the semantic similarity between u and v
over any sequences of time periods as
simS(u, v) := 1− E
[Dvu({τ, τ ′})] . (9)
What we compute in (8) is the minimum geographic mo-
bility dissimilarity between u and v where the locations of
v are relabeled and mapped to locations of u according to
the permutation function σvu (which is the σ that minimizes
8). The intuition is the following. Consider two individu-
als u and v are at r and σ(r), respectively, at time period
τ . The Mallows distance Md computes how dissimilar their
movement will be to the next location which are represented
with random variables r′ for u and σ(r′′) for v. If, according
to a mapping, the way that they move between these loca-
tions is similar, they behave similarly with respect to those
locations. If this is true across different time periods and
location pairs, their mobilities are similar. So, the semantic
similarity between two individuals is determined by σvu.
We compute this metric at two different levels of accu-
racy of the mobility model. If we only consider the visiting
probability pi part of each individual’s mobility profile, we
compute simS as follows. Let us consider the hamming dis-
tance function d(r, r′) = 1r 6=σ−1(r′). In this case, we can
compute the semantic similarity metric as
1−
∑
τ
Pr{τ} max
σ
∑
r
min{pirτ (u), piσ(r)τ (v)}. (10)
Note that the computation of (10) requires finding the
mapping σ which maximizes the inner term for each time
period τ . Since there are R! possible candidates for the
maximum mapping σ, a brute-force approach is inefficient.
However, the problem’s structure resembles that of a linear
assignment. Focusing on the inner sum, we see that each
term (each r) can be associated with R values of σ(r) inde-
pendently of the other components of σ. To recast the prob-
lem as a linear assignment, we construct a bipartite graph
where the nodes represent R and σ(R), and each edge rep-
resents the association (through σ) of r with σ(r). The max-
imum weight assignment of the constructed bipartite graph
gives the permutation σ. The running time of this procedure
is O(T ·R3) using the Hungarian algorithm [20].
We compute the semantic similarity for the case where we
consider the more accurate mobility profile 〈p, pi〉 as follows.
1−
∑
τ,τ ′
max
σ
∑
r,r′
pir,τ (u)pτ
′
r,τ (u) min{pr
′
r,τ,τ ′(u), p
σ(r′)
σ(r),τ,τ ′(u)}
(11)
It is not known whether there is an efficient algorithm to
compute the semantic similarity according to (11). The dif-
ficulty comes from having to consider assignments of pairs:
(r, r′) to (σ(r), σ(r′)), which makes this computation resem-
ble the Quadratic Assignment Problem (QAP) [21], known
to be NP-Hard and APX-Hard. The semantic similarity (11)
can nevertheless be computed through approximation tech-
niques such as Simulated Annealing [5], or the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm [19]. Nevertheless, (11) can be approxi-
mated using techniques such as Simulated Annealing [5], or
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. [19]. We use this algo-
rithm to compute the semantic similarity metric, in the case
of considering both visiting and transition probabilities of
the individuals’ mobility models (see [18] for details). The
idea is to find good approximations to the quantity of inter-
est (for us σ) through probabilistic local exploration of the
solution space. At each step, we replace our current permu-
tation with a new solution randomly selected from its neigh-
bors (e.g. a permutation which differs in two positions). The
output of the algorithm is the best permutation found so far
when the algorithm terminates (after some fixed number of
iterations). It is known that the starting permutation can
have an impact on the quality of the output. In our case,
we expect the permutation found during the computation of
(10) to be a good starting point.
4. GENERATING FAKE TRACES
In this section, we present the details of our algorithms for
sampling fake traces. Figure 2 presents a high-level view.
The process of generating and using fake traces are com-
pletely separate. When a set of fake traces are generated,
they can be used in any protection mechanism accordingly.
4.1 Transform Traces into Semantic Domain
We assume that we have a dataset S of real traces that
we use as seed to generate fake traces. Each seed trace in
the dataset comes from a different individual. Generating
a fake trace starts by transforming a real trace (taken as
seed) to a semantic trace. To this end, we require to know
the semantic coordinates of the seed trace. We compute the
semantic similarity between all locations in R, and create a
location semantic graph G〈R, E, w〉 such that the vertices
are in R and the weight wG(r, r′) on the edge between lo-
cations r and r′ is the weighted sum of the number pairs of
users u and v for whom r and r′ is semantically mapped (i.e.,
r = σvu(r
′)), weighted according to their similarity. Then,
we create the equivalent semantic classes C by running a
clustering algorithm on this graph. For this purpose, we
make use of k-means clustering algorithm, and we choose
the number of clusters such that it optimizes the cluster-
ing objective. We present the sketch of this algorithm in
Figure 2-SemanticClustering().
We then convert the seed location trace seed into its cor-
responding semantic trace semseed by simply replacing each
location in the trace with all its semantically equivalent loca-
tions (according to the semantic classes C). Figure 3 depicts
an example of such a semantic seed. Intuitively, this com-
posite trace encompasses all possible geographic traces that
have a high semantic similarity to the original seed trace. To
be more flexible with respect to the traces that we can gener-
ate, we add some randomness to the semantic seed trace. In
the transformation process of the seed trace into the seman-
SemanticSimilarity(u, v)
Compute mobility models 〈p(u), pi(u)〉 and 〈p(v), pi(v)〉
Compute optimal mapping σvu from (8)
Compute semantic similarity simS(u, v) from (9)
Return simS(u, v), σ
v
u
SemanticClustering(R,S, κ)
Initiate weighted graph G with locations R as vertices
Forall u, v ∈ S, u 6= v:
Set svu, σ
v
u ← SemanticSimilarity(u, v)
Forall locations r, r′ ∈ R such that r′ = σvu(r):
Set edge weight wG(r, r
′)← wG(r, r′) + svu
Set C ← K-Means(G, κ)
Return C
PrivacyTest(fake, seed, pars, pari, pard)
Set geographic similarity sim← simG(fake, seed)
Set intersection between fake and seed int ← Intersec-
tion(fake, seed)
Set dp← TRUE if
∃s′1,··· ,k−1 such that |simS(s, f)− simS(s′, f)| < pard
Return TRUE if int < pari and sim < pars and dp
GenerateFake(R,S, κ, pars)
Compute aggregate mobility model 〈p¯, p¯i〉 by averaging
〈p(u), pi(u)〉 over all u ∈ S
Set C ← SemanticClustering(R,S, κ)
Forall seed ∈ S:
Set C′ ← C
Update C′ by removing each location in any partition with
probability parc.
Set semantic seed semseed← seed
Update semseed by replacing all locations r in the trace
with the set of locations in their corresponding clus-
ters, i.e., replace r with C′i where r ∈ C′i
Update semseed by removing the location r = seed(t) at
any time t with probability parl
Update semseed by merging locations that are located
with time distance ∆t with probability parm
∆t
Set fake← HMMDecode(semseed, 〈p¯, p¯i〉)
If PrivacyTest(fake, seed, pars, pari, pard)
Set F ← F ∪ fake
Return F
Figure 2: Fake traces generation algorithm. We present it
simplified for the case with a single time period.
tic trace, we sub-sample locations from the semantic classes
as opposed to using them all. For privacy reasons, we re-
move each location in a cluster with probability parc. The
result is a new cluster C′. We also allow locations of different
classes to merge into each other closer to the time instants
where the user moves from one class to the other. We imple-
ment this by merging a location between two cluster visited
∆t time instants away with a geometric probability parm
∆t.
4.2 Sample a Trace from the Semantic Domain
Any random walk on the semantic seed trace that crosses
the available locations at each time instant is a valid location
trace that is semantically similar to the seed trace. However,
the synthetic traces we want to generate also need to be
geographically consistent with the general mobility of people
in the considered area.
We cast the problem of sampling such traces as a decoding
problem in Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) [22]. The sym-
bols are locations, the observables are the semantic classes
(or the set of semantically equivalent locations in the same
class), and the transition probability matrix is our aggregate
mobility model. We construct the aggregate mobility model
by averaging over the mobility models of all traces in dataset
S, as well as giving a small probability to the possible move-
ments between locations according to their distance and con-
nectivity. More precisely, we compute the aggregate tran-
sition probability p¯r
′
r as
∑
u∈S p
r′
r (u)+·max(1,d(r,r′))−2
zr
, where
 is a small constant, and zr is the normalizing factor. We
compute the aggregate visiting probability p¯ir as the average
of pir(u), for all u ∈ S. The probability distribution p¯i is also
the steady state probability distribution of p¯.
By decoding the semantic trace into geographic traces us-
ing HMMs, we generate traces that are probable according
to aggregate mobility models, i.e., there could be one indi-
vidual who prefers to take that trajectory. There are differ-
ent HMM decoding algorithms. We make use of the Viterbi
algorithm which is a dynamic programming algorithm to
generate the most probable trace given the observation (i.e.,
the sematic seed trace) [30]. More precisely, Viterbi finds
arg max
fake
Pr{fake|semseed(t), 〈p¯, p¯i〉}
assuming that fake(t) can only choose from locations in
semseed(t). Finding the most likely fake trace is equivalent
to finding the shortest path in an edge-weighted directed
graph where each location at time instant t is linked to all
locations at the subsequent time in the semantic seed trace.
By using this encoding technique, we make sure that the
sampled trace is consistent with the generic mobility and
has a significant probability of (geographically) being a real
trace. However, Viterbi produces (only) one trace, hence we
cannot directly generate multiple fake traces. To address
this issue, we add randomness to the trace reconstruction of
Viterbi. We modify the Viterbi algorithm, which originally,
at each step (time instant) selects the most probable location
in the path; we add some randomness to the probabilities
such that the algorithm does not deterministically select the
most probable location. More precisely, we slightly perturb
the probabilities in such a way that Viterbi selects randomly
among a set of locations that are close in probability to the
most probable location. We implement this idea by choosing
a parameter parv and multiplying all the probabilities of
moving from one location to the next with a random number
between 1 and parv.
4.3 Threat Model
The threat against fake trace generating algorithms is
twofold. (1) One threat is directly related to the adversary
who wants to filter out traces that are fake and to find out
the true location of mobile users (localization attack), e.g.,
when it is used in location based services to hide the true lo-
cation of the user. For this attack, we assume the adversary
semantic classes:
f t t z x x pseed:
f t t z x x p
d d d d w w b
y y y y a a l
g g
semantic seed:
f t t z x x p
d d d d w w b
y y y y a a l
g g
fake trace:
d b
w x
Figure 3: A sketch of generating a fake trace from a seed.
Each location is represented by an English letter in a box.
The semantic class associated with each location is repre-
sented by a different color. The semantic seed trace is a
trace that includes the locations in the seed along with other
locations in the same cluster at each time instant. Here, lo-
cations are clustered as {y, d, f, t, z}, {g, a, w, x}, {l, b, p}. To
generate a fake trace, we first probabilistically remove the
seed location and probabilistically merge subsequent classes.
In our example, f, z, p are removed, and w, d, b, x are merged
into their neighboring visited clusters. We then run a de-
coder to generate a probable trace given the possibility of
choosing from all available locations at each time instant.
The fake trace is shown with dashed boxes. A rejection test
will run on this trace to guarantee its privacy compliance.
has a background knowledge on general mobility models of
users in the considered area. In Section 5.6, we quantify
the success rate of an adversary in localizing users while
fake traces are used as a defense mechanism. (2) The other
threat is secondary as it is related to the algorithm that
generates the fakes, and comes from the adversary whose
goal is to identify the real individuals whose trace are used
as seed (membership inclusion attack). In the next subsec-
tion, we enforce a privacy property that protects against the
second threat. We guarantee plausible deniability for seed
contributors independently from the adversary’s knowledge.
4.4 Privacy Tests
In the end, we want to make sure that the generated fake
traces do not leak information about the seed trace. We
design tests to protect against the following threat model.
We assume the adversary has access to traces (or mobility
patterns) of some individuals that might overlap with the
set of individuals who contribute to the seed dataset. The
attacks depend on the scenario in which a fake trace is used.
The adversary might be interested in separating fake from
real (in LBS scenario) or finding the seed from which a fake
trace is generated (in trace publishing scenario). To protect
against such threats, as the last step of our process, we run
a PrivacyTest() on each of the generated fake traces.
– We compute the geographic similarity of each fake trace
to the seed trace and reject the fake trace if its similarity is
higher than a threshold pars. This makes sure that the
fake trace does not statistically leak information about the
mobility of the individual behind the seed trace. We also
reject a fake trace if its intersection with the seed trace is
larger than pari. This makes sure that the exact locations
visited by the individual are not present in the fake trace.
These tests provide the privacy guarantee with respect to
information leakage of visited locations.
– We also use another notion of privacy, which is more
of relevance in the case of publishing a location dataset.
Specifically, we want to defend against membership inclusion
attacks, in which an adversary wants to infer whether a par-
ticular individual’s data was included in the seed dataset.
Therefore, we design another privacy test that guarantees
plausible deniability for those whose trace was used as seed.
The main idea is that a fake trace should be as semantically
similar to its own seed as to some other real traces which are
not included in the seed dataset, so that an adversary cannot
certainly infer that a particular individual was in the seed
dataset and de-anonymize the seed contributor. Intuitively,
if the semantic similarity of a fake trace to its own seed is
comparable to its semantic similarity with some non-seed
real trace, then the fake trace could have been generated
from either of them. To enforce this property, we test if for
a generated fake trace f (that was generated from a seed
trace s), there are some other real trace s′ such that their
differential semantic similarity is bounded.
|simS(s, f)− simS(s′, f)| < pard
We can enforce this to hold for a minimum k−1 number of
alternative s′ traces (from which we are not going to publish
fake traces). Thus, there is at least one real trace outside
the set of seeds associated with fake traces that could have
produced each releasable fake trace. More generally, we en-
force the size of anonymity set to be k. This property, which
provides plausible deniability, is conceptually related to, but
weaker than, Differential Privacy (DP) [9]. Indeed, this is
one kind of guarantee that differential privacy is meant to
provide.3 That said, we enforce this property for actual
seeds in the datasets. Thus, by looking at a fake trace the
adversary cannot surely conclude that a particular trace was
in the seed dataset, because there exist at least k − 1 other
traces that could have seeded the same fake trace.
Each time we generate a new fake trace that passes the
privacy tests, we compute its likelihood based on the aggre-
gate mobility model. One can then randomly sample from
the bag of fake traces based on this likelihood. The traces
that are generated according to this process do not leak in-
formation about the seed traces, yet they share their average
geographic features and semantic features.
4.5 Discussion
The fake generation process, which results in a pool of fake
traces having passed the privacy test, is run offline on power-
ful machines, before the users’ device retrieve and use such
fakes. Therefore, this computational burden is not placed
on the users’ device. Nevertheless, the generation process is
reasonably efficient: the computation of both the aggregate
mobility and the semantic clustering needs to be done only
once for each input set of real traces. The former takes time
O(SL+(RT )2) where S = |S| is the number of seed traces, L
is the length (i.e., number of events) of each seed trace. The
3
DP can be thought of as providing plausible deniability by thinking
of the differing elements between the two neighboring datasets as two
possible inputs of the same user. When DP is satisfied, the output
distribution is approximately the same, so that that user can plausibly
pretend having used any one of the two inputs.
(a) Visited Locations. The size of
locations are proportional to their
total visits.
(b) Visited locations colored ac-
cording to their semantic cluster-
ing (20 clusters).
Figure 4: 400 locations visited around Lausanne and nearby
towns by the 30 users. Some users commute between two
towns whereas the majority of them live and work in the
same city of Lausanne (the area with higher concentration).
latter is dominated by S(S − 1) semantic similarity compu-
tations (e.g., each taking O(TR3) in the zeroth-order case)
and one clustering operation. Excluding the final clustering,
this step is embarrassingly parallel: the semantic similarity
for any two users u, v can be computed independently. Also,
if a few input traces are added, both the aggregate statis-
tics and the semantic clustering can be updated and do not
need to be recomputed from scratch. Once the semantic
clustering has been computed, an arbitrarily large number
of fakes for each seed can be generated. This process is also
embarrassingly parallel, since each fake can be generated
independently of other fakes for that seed, and other seeds.
The algorithm of Figure 2 works if the input dataset con-
tains at least two seed traces. However, its quality will be
high if, among the seed traces: the coverage of the loca-
tion set R is high (not necessarily complete); the semantic
similarity is high; and the geographic similarity is low.
5. EVALUATION
In this section, we run our algorithms on a set of real lo-
cation traces and evaluate their utility and privacy in two
scenarios: publishing a location dataset, and sharing loca-
tions with a location-based service.
5.1 Dataset
The dataset we use for the evaluation is collected through
the Nokia Lausanne Data Collection Campaign4 (see [14]).
We prepare the dataset for our needs in two phases, filling
gaps in the traces and discretizing the time and location.
The raw dataset contains events of three types: GPS (the
GPS position of the user is known), WLAN (the SSID and
signal strength of a set wireless networks which surround the
user are known), and GSM (the identifier of the GSM base
station to which the user’s phone is associated is known).
In the first phase, we compute valid traces (out of possibly
partial traces) by aggregating events and filling gaps. We
do this by interpolating along the path of consecutive GPS
points and using the WLAN and GSM information.
In the second phase, we extract two days of traces for
30 users, such that each trace contains a sequence of 72
locations (i.e., one location is reported every 20 minutes).
Some locations are visited very rarely only by very few users.
4
http://research.nokia.com/page/11367
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Figure 5: Normalized histogram of the (a) geographic simi-
larity and (b) semantic similarity of all distinct pairs of 30
users. (a) Mobility models of different individuals is geo-
graphically very specific to themselves, i.e., they are unique.
This is well reflected in the skewed distribution of geographic
similarity towards very small values. (b) As hypothesized in
this paper, majority of individuals have high semantic sim-
ilarities with respect to their mobility models.
Thus, we reduce the number of locations from 1491 to 400 by
clustering close-by locations together. We use a hierarchical
clustering algorithm for this purpose, in which the distance
between two locations is taken to be proportional to both the
Euclidean distance between the locations and the product of
their weights (defined as the number of total visits to each
location, for all users). This means that locations clustered
together will tend be both geographical close and have few
visits. The geographical distribution of visits of all users over
the locations in the considered area is shown in Figure 4(a).
We computed the mobility profiles of all 30 users, and
then the semantic location graph by calculating a similarity
score for each pair of locations, averaged across all users.
After clustering this semantic location graph, we obtained
20 location clusters. We choose this number of clusters as
it provides optimal clustering i.e., it maximizes the ratio
of inter-cluster similarity over intra-cluster similarity. This
clustering is illustrated in Figure 4(b), where each location
is drawn with the color of the cluster it belongs to. The
figure allows us to distinguish some patterns, for example
locations at the center of cities are mostly in blue, while
many locations representing roads and highways are colored
in red. Also notice that the semantic clustering does not
seem to depend on the geographical distance of locations.
To illustrate the difference between geographic and seman-
tic similarities, we can compute those metrics pairwise over
all 30 users.5 The result is shown in Figures 5(a), and 5(b).
The first histogram shows that the 30 users are not strongly
geographically similar to each other, except for a few pairs
of users. This is expected given the range of locations they
explore overall, as seen in Figure 4(a). On the other hand,
the distribution of the semantic similarity across all distinct
pairs of users has a larger variance; while some pairs of users
are not similar at all (e.g., those with semantic similarity
score of 0.2), a large number of users are highly similar.
5.2 Fake Trace Generator Tool
We build our tool to generate fake traces on top of the
open-source Location Privacy Meter (LPM) [27]. To exploit
LPM’s modularity we split our algorithm into modules. To
5
Since both the geometric similarity, and the semantic similarity of
a user with herself is 1.0, we exclude such pairs.
implement the time-dependent sub-sampling of clusters and
merging around transitions, and the transformation of users’
actual traces into semantic traces, we use the location ob-
fuscation mechanism feature of the tool. The reconstruction
of geographically valid synthetic traces from the semantic
traces is done using the Viterbi algorithm (implemented in
LPM as a tracking attack). To cluster the semantic location
graph, we employ the CLUTO toolkit [31].
5.3 Simulation Setup
As for the parameters of the GenerateFake() algorithm, we
set the location-removal probability parc to 0.25, and we set
the location merging probability parm to 0.75. We set the
probability parl of removing the true location visited in the
seed to 1.0. We set the randomization multiplication fac-
tor for Viterbi randomization to 4. So, for each probability
assigned to each location at each time instant, we multiply
it with a randomly chosen number between 1 to 4. We set
very tight values for the privacy parameters. We set pari,
the maximum intersection between fake and seed, to 0. So,
we do not tolerate any intersection between fake and seed.
We set the geographic similarity threshold pars to 0.1, and
the differential semantic similarity threshold also to 0.1.
For each of the 30 users, we generated about 500 fake
traces. Out of those we randomly pick 50 traces (for each
user) to be used for the datasets publishing scenario. For the
LBS scenario, we sampled traces (for each user) according
to the traces likelihoods, out of the pool of traces (for that
user) which passed the privacy test.
Out of the two days of traces (each 72 timestamps, for each
of the 30 users), we use the first day as the training dataset,
and the second day as the testing dataset. We calculate
the aggregate statistics and mobility profile of users on the
training dataset, while we use the testing dataset to evaluate
both the data publishing scenario and the attack for the LBS
scenario. Unless otherwise stated, for all experiments, we
consider a single time-period, and compute the zeroth order
versions of the geographic and semantic similarities.
5.4 Evaluation Metrics
In the following two subsections we evaluate the use of
fake traces in two popular scenarios: publishing a dataset of
fake traces, and using fake locations along with real locations
when accessing location-based services. In both scenarios,
we evaluate our fake traces with respect to two metrics: pri-
vacy and utility. The privacy guarantee that we provide
using our privacy rejection test applies to both scenarios.
However, there are some differences in terms of the adver-
sary model between different scenarios. There are therefore
some additional considerations regarding the privacy of users
in location-based services, e.g., their privacy against infer-
ence attacks, that we discuss in its corresponding subsection.
The utility metric is very dependent on the application (sce-
nario), hence is measured differently in each case.
5.5 Scenario: Publishing Location Datasets
5.5.1 Setup
In this scenario, we assume that we generate a fake trace
for some seed traces and publish them all in a dataset. We
use some real traces in our dataset that we use as alternative
seeds in the differential semantic similarity test.
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Figure 6: Histogram of the differen-
tial semantic similarity between fake
and real traces. It presents the dis-
tribution of the absolute difference
|simS(s, f) − simS(s′, f)|, for all pairs
of f (plus its seed s) and s′.
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Figure 7: Normalized histogram of
the semantic similarity of all dis-
tinct pairs of: each of the 30 real
traces, along with their associated
fake traces.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Quantiles (Seeds − Seeds)
Qu
an
tile
s (
Fa
ke
s −
 Fa
ke
s)
Figure 8: Q-Q plot for comparing
two distributions: semantic similarity
among all real seed traces, and seman-
tic similarity among all fake traces.
The plot shows a very strong corre-
lation between two distributions.
5.5.2 Privacy
We assume an adversary wants to infer information about
the true traces that have been used to generate the fakes.
Due to the privacy test, location privacy of individuals who
contributed to the seed dataset is guaranteed as fake traces
do not intersect with the locations that are visited and does
not even leak statistically about what could have been vis-
ited by those individuals. Moreover, due to the differential
semantic similarity test, the seed traces are not the only
traces that could have generated the released fake traces.
Out of all fake traces that we generated from our 30
seed traces, on average 80% of them could pass the geo-
graphic and intersection privacy tests with tight constraints
(pari = 0, i.e., no intersection allowed, and pars = 0.1),
so it is not difficult to generate fake traces that satisfy such
privacy guarantees. Regarding the differential semantic sim-
ilarity test, we should be able to find enough number of real
traces as alternative traces that could have been the seed
for releasing fake traces. In Figure 6, we show the difference
between semantic similarity of a fake trace and its seed with
the semantic similarity of the same fake trace and any other
real trace in our dataset. The histogram shows that the ma-
jority of fake traces have very low similarity to real traces
other than their seeds. This is due to the high semantic sim-
ilarity between real traces (Figure 5b) so it is not difficult to
find potential alternative seeds for a fake trace. We set pard
to 0.1 to obtain a high level of differential semantic privacy.
5.5.3 Utility
To preserve the utility of the original traces, fake traces
should share similar statistical properties with the real trace
dataset. Note, however, that we would not expect all useful
statistics to be preserved since some may be counter to our
goal of preserving privacy. That is, certain geographic fea-
tures are expected not to be preserved, due to the nature of
the generation and the privacy test. For example, if a loca-
tion is primarily visited by a single user in the real dataset,
it is unlikely that the location would be visited with similar
frequency by a (fake) user in the fake trace dataset. This is
because if such a fake trace were generated from that seed,
the privacy test would reject it. Nevertheless, we can evalu-
ate to what extent certain useful statistics are preserved.
To start, we compare the basic mobility statistics obtained
from the real and fake datasets. We compute the aggre-
gate mobility model for each fake dataset (we generate 10 of
size 30), and compare its geographic similarity with the real
dataset. More precisely, for a fake dataset F , we compute
〈p¯F , p¯iF 〉 and compute its similarity to 〈p¯, p¯i〉. The statistical
similarity of p¯F with p¯ over all fake datasets is
[0.8061, 0.8073, 0.0060]
on (average, median, standard deviation), and the results
for the statistical similarity of p¯iF with p¯i is
[0.7856, 0.7867, 0.0152].
Both these results show a strong correlation between aver-
age/aggregate mobility information of real and fake datasets.
We then compare the location visiting probabilities of the
real dataset and fake datasets. Namely, for each dataset we
compute the spatial allocation, i.e., for each location (from
least to most popular, for that dataset), we calculate the
number of visits spent in that location across all traces in the
dataset. We then normalize this quantity to obtain a proba-
bility distribution over locations (sorted by popularity), i.e.,
for each location we have the probability of a random visit
to that location. From these distributions, we compute the
KL-divergence of the real (training) dataset to each of our
fake datasets, and to a variety of baselines.6 The results
are shown in Table 2. Since the KL-divergence is not up-
per bounded, we use as baselines the KL-divergences of the
real (training) dataset to the following distributions: real
testing dataset; uniform visiting probabilities; and single lo-
cation visiting. We see that while the KL-divergence of the
real (training) dataset to the real testing dataset is smaller
than that to the fake datasets, the latter is also significantly
smaller than both the the KL-divergences to the uniform
visiting baseline and the single location visiting baseline.
This indicate that a lot of information is preserved in the
fake datasets. Next, we repeat the previous calculation of
KL-divergence, but considering only visits to the 50 most
popular locations (of each dataset). Table 3 shows the re-
6
Because the KL-divergence is only defined at points where the second
distribution is not zero, unless the first is also zero, we set all zero
probabilities to  = 0.1, before normalizing. This is required because
there may be locations which are visited in the fake dataset but not
in the real dataset, or vice-versa.
sults: the information is almost as well preserved in the fake
datasets than compared to the real testing dataset.
We also compare the users time allocation of the real and
fake datasets. Namely, for each dataset and each user, we
calculate the time spent at each location, among the loca-
tions visited. That is, we calculate, for the three most pop-
ular locations of that user, what proportion of the time is
spent in each. We perform this calculation across all 30 users
and normalize the result. We compare this distribution for
the real and fake datasets. Table 4 shows the KL-divergence
of the real (training) dataset to the fake datasets and base-
lines: real testing dataset; uniform time allocation (each user
spends 1/k proportion of time at each of the k locations);
random time allocation (each user spends a uniformly ran-
dom proportion of time at the location). This statistic is
highly preserved in the fakes; sometimes the fake datasets’
distribution is closer to that of the real (training) dataset,
than the distribution of the real testing dataset is.
The previous results provide confidence that useful infor-
mation is indeed preserved in the fake traces dataset. That
said, our original goal was to preserve utility in the sense
of semantic similarity, so it sensible to wonder how close we
are to that goal. To determine this, we first compute the se-
mantic similarity of each fake trace with its own seed trace
to check if the semantic features of the original traces are
indeed preserved. Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of this
value over all fake traces. Clearly, the distribution is biased
towards higher similarity values. So, the fake traces consid-
erably preserve the semantic features of the real traces.
Another type of statistics that we would expect the set
of fake traces to preserve is the inner similarity between
the set of traces. In Figure 8, we present the correlation
between two distributions: semantic similarity among real
traces, and semantic similarity among fake traces. The Q-Q
plot shows a significant correlation between these two distri-
butions; they are strongly linearly related. This reflect that
in addition to maintaining the information about each seed,
we also preserve the statistical relation among the traces.
Results show that fake traces cannot be distinguished from
the real ones if it appears among some real traces. This is
because the relation between a fake trace and the distribu-
tion of real traces is largely indifferent from that of a real
trace with respect to both semantic and geographic features.
5.6 Scenario: Using Location-based Services
The utility and privacy evaluation for the publishing dataset
scenario applies to the case where traces are shared with a
service provider. However, we can perform a more specific
analysis on the fake locations when they are shared in a new
setting. We present the details of how fake locations are used
Testing Fakes Uniform Single
0.0377
Mean Std
1.1918 4.6666
0.3841 0.0432
Table 2: KL-divergence of the location visiting probabilities
of the real (training) datasets against the 10 fake datasets,
and various baselines. “Testing” is the testing portion of the
real dataset (see Section 5.3); “Uniform” is the uniform dis-
tribution over all locations; and “Single” is the distribution
where all users always visit the same location.
to protect location privacy, and how they perform against
inference attacks despite the fact that they have passed pri-
vacy guarantee tests.
5.6.1 Setup
We assume a user shares her current location with a location-
based service with a probability β (set to 0.5 in our case).
The service provider, in return, provides the user with con-
textual information about the shared locations (e.g., list of
nearby restaurants, current traffic information on the road).
The service provider would receive a sequence of locations
that are visited by the user at different time instants. To
protect her location privacy, i.e., hiding her location at the
time of access to the LBS and also preventing the inference of
the full trajectory, the user sends a number of fake locations
along with her true location. We assume the user has access
to some full fake traces, and at any time instant t, when she
is accessing the server, she consistently adds the locations
visited at t on each fake trace to her actual location at t and
sends them to the server. The service provider responds to
each of these location queries, and the user needs to filter
out the results associated with fake locations to obtain the
information about her true location.
We evaluate a few other methods to generate fake loca-
tions along with our method for comparison.
• Uniform IID: We sample each fake location indepen-
dently and identically distributed from the uniform
probability distribution.
• Aggregate Mobility IID: We sample each fake location
independently and identically distributed from the ag-
gregate mobility probability distribution p¯i.
• Random Walk on Aggregate Mobility: We sample a
fake trace by doing a random walk on the set of loca-
tions following the probability distribution p¯.
• Random Walk on User’s Mobility: We do a random
walk on the set of locations following the probability
distribution p(u) to generate a fake trace.
5.6.2 Privacy
We assume the adversary wants to filter out the fake lo-
cations and to find the true sequence of locations that are
Testing Fakes Uniform Single
0.0215
Mean Std
0.2040 5.1131
0.0289 0.0086
Table 3: KL-divergence of the 50 most popular location vis-
iting probabilities of the real (training) datasets against the
10 fake datasets, and various baselines (see Table 2).
Testing Fakes Uniform Random
1
st 0.0189
Mean Std
0.1652 0.6794
0.0125 0.0022
2
n
d 0.0026
Mean Std
0.0778 0.5360
0.0092 0.0031
3
rd 0.0114
Mean Std
0.0779 0.5092
0.0089 0.0036
Table 4: KL-divergence of the the users time allocation dis-
tribution among the three most popular locations (of each
user) of the real (training) datasets against the 10 fake
datasets, and various baselines.
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Figure 9: Location privacy versus utility loss for different
fake generating algorithms. The privacy is measured as
probability of error of adversary in guessing the correct lo-
cation of users. We plot the median location privacy across
all 30 users. The probability of connecting to the LBS is set
to 0.5, so one half of the time instants the users connect to
the server. We evaluate the use of 1, 5, 10 fake traces, hence
three dots for each algorithm. (We repeated the experiment
20 times and took the average: 4 times with a different se-
lection of fake traces, and for each of such selection, 5 times
to eliminate the randomness of exposures.) The utility loss
is the number of distinct locations that are sent to the server
(9a), and the number of (distinct) semantic classes (i.e., clus-
ters) exposed for each event (9b).
visited by the user. The privacy metric that we use is based
on the error of adversary in his inference attack [27]. Put
simply, the fraction of true locations that are missed by the
adversary is our privacy metric. More precisely, the metric
is the probability of error of inference attack on guessing
the correct location. We assume the adversary makes use
of the aggregate mobility model 〈p¯, p¯i〉 to single out the true
locations and reconstruct the true location of the user.
5.6.3 Utility
There is an overhead to these privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms, as a user has to send more than one query to the
server to get the results for one query. This can be inter-
preted as utility loss, and so we define two metrics for (the
lack of) utility. The first is the number of distinct locations
sent by the user at each time (diversity overhead). Note
that this number can be less than the number of fake traces
as they might intersect at the times of connection to the
server. Additionally, some service providers (e.g., Google
Now) might profile the user over time based on the type of
locations she visits, in order to provide recommendations or
reminders. In these cases, the queries that are sent to the
server can pollute the profile of the user hence reduce the
predictability power of the service provider. For this, we
use the number of (distinct) semantic clusters among the
locations sent by the user at each time (semantic overhead).
5.6.4 Results
Figure 9 shows the tradeoff between location privacy and
utility for various methods of generating fake traces. We
evaluate the utility loss in terms of two metrics: diversity
overhead (Figure 9a), and semantic overhead (Figure 9b).
We evaluate the privacy for exposure probability β = 0.5,
and three different number of fake traces: 1, 5, 10. Although
the number of fake traces are the same, across different al-
gorithms, but the average number of distinct locations sent
to the LBS is not the same. This is because of the high
randomness in the Uniform IID, Agg Mobility IID, and RW
Agg Mobility that select fake traces from all possible loca-
tions. Our method and the RW User Profile method have
both lower diversity overhead and lower semantic overhead
in the set of fake locations. Our method, clearly outper-
forms all the tested methods, especially the random strate-
gies. For the case of RW User Profile method, the privacy
level against tracking attack gets closer to what we achieve
(which is very close to the maximum), due to the fact that
the fake traces generated by RW User Profile are geographi-
cally very similar to the true location of the user, and hence
creates high confusion, hence error, for the adversary. Note
that the RW User Profile is never a privacy-preserving fake
injection method as the adversary can easily de-anonymize
and profile the user, no matter if he makes mistakes on ex-
actly tracking the user at each access time (as shown here).
Whereas, our method is ensured to have minimal geo-
graphic mutual information with the true trace, thus it is
robust against profiling attack. We also ensure that the
fake traces have small differential semantic similarity, thus
they are robust against de-anonymization. Additionally, the
plot shows that our method is the strongest fake generating
algorithm against an attacker who is interested in filtering
out the fake locations and localize the user over time.
6. RELATEDWORK
Location obfuscation is a prevalent non-cryptographic tech-
nique to protect location privacy. It does not require chang-
ing the infrastructure, as it can also be done all on the user’s
side either by altering (perturbing) the location coordinates
to be reported or by sending fake location reports interleaved
or along with the true location of the user.
Many location perturbation techniques have been pro-
posed in the literature, usually based on adding some noise
to the user’s location coordinates or reducing its granular-
ity, e.g., [1, 2, 10, 28]. The downside of these techniques is
that they reduce the service quality of the user in interaction
with the location-based service (LBS) provider. This is be-
cause the server provides contextual information related to
the shared location and not the true location of the user. So,
users have to trade service quality to obtain their required
level of privacy. Optimal solutions for location perturbation
techniques are proposed [4, 28] which show the high cost of
location privacy on service quality using perturbation.
Hiding the user’s true location among fake locations is a
promising yet very little-explored approach to protecting lo-
cation privacy. There are few simple techniques proposed
so far: adding independently selected fake locations drawn
from the population’s location distribution [26], generating
dummy locations at random as a random walk on a grid
[13, 32], constructing fake driving trips by building the path
between two random locations on the map given the more
probable paths traveled by drivers [15], or adding noise to
the paths generated by road trip planner algorithms [6].
These solutions lack a formal model for human mobility and
do not consider the semantics associated with sequence of
locations visited by people over time. Thus, the generated
traces can be distinguished from real location traces.
This paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the first that
proposes a systematic methodology for generating fake loca-
tion traces based on statistical features of both geographical
and semantic dimensions of real traces, and based on a met-
ric to measure how realistic a synthetic trace is. Moreover,
we introduce multiple privacy tests to ensure that the pub-
lished/shared fake traces themselves do not leak informa-
tion about real seed traces. Our evaluation on real data also
shows the clear advantage of our algorithm with respect to
other existing approaches against known inference attacks.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This is the first paper to address the problem of generat-
ing realistic synthetic location traces based on a quantitative
metrics. Generating such traces is very useful to protect pri-
vacy of users when they share location with location-based
services, or when we want to publish a dataset of locations
to be used for various research reasons. Based on well-
established statistical methods, we propose two metrics to
quantify geographic and semantic features of human mobil-
ity. Using these metrics, we propose efficient algorithms to
generate fake traces that do not leak geographic information
about real individuals (guaranteed using a privacy rejection
test), yet highly resemble the mobility of a population se-
mantically. We show that inference attacks cannot identify
the true location of mobile users if our fake traces are used
as protection. We also quantitatively show that our method
is superior to all existing methods of generating fake traces.
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